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MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
the best of circumstances, the possibility of a high degreee of subjectivity in
the use of informed opinion is always present. In addition, questions arise
as to how measurement of contemporary attitudes concerning the offense
is to be made.87 On balance, however, Judge Seiler's proposed test con-
tributes substantially to the establishment of an objective basis for making
determinations in eighth amendment cases.
Mitchell does not portend well for future defendants charged with the
sale of marijuana in Missouri. The decision blunts the effectiveness of the
primary constitutional challenges. In the absence of conclusive proof of
the harmlessness of marijuana, an argument based on equal protection
grounds is likely to fail. A cruel and unusual punishment attack also is not
a viable approach as long as subjective standards such as Johnson are ap-
plied and as long as Missouri appellate courts defer to the trial courts in
sentencing. As a result, until the Missouri Supreme Court defines the
evidence sufficient to constitute conclusive proof in regard to the harmless-
ness of marijuana or until it adopts a more objective approach in applying
the eighth amendment, long sentences for marijuana offenses can be ex-
pected to continue in Missouri.
DOUGLAS Y. CURRAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE
RIGHTS OF MINORS-REQUIRING
NOTICE TO PARENTS OF APPOINTMENT
OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM
M.S. v. Wermers'
M.S., an otherwise unidentified minor female, was denied prescrip-
tion contraceptives by her county family planning clinic. 2 M.S., who was
fifteen years of age and unmarried, was unable to obtain her parent's con-
sent for such contraceptives. She sought to bring a class action under sec-
87. One commentator has suggested that public sentiment in death penalty
cases be ascertained through the use of random opinion surveys. See Thomas,
Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevance of In-
formed Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1005 (1977).
1. 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. Non-prescription contraceptives are available without parental consent.
Id. at 173 n.I.
3. 557 F.2d at 176 n.5.
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tion 19834 based on her right to privacy. Without deciding the merits of
the underlying dispute, the district court held that a guardian ad litem was
necessary and ordered her to notify her parents of the hearing on the ap-
pointment.5 When she refused to notify her parents, the district court
dismissed her case.
6
M.S. appealed, claiming the court's dismissal was an abuse of discre-
tion, both in refusing to let her proceed without a guardian ad litem and in
dismissing the action for failure to give her parents notice of the hearing on
the appointment. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it
was not an abuse of discretion to require the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for a minor plaintiff,7 but it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss her
action for failure to notify her parents of the hearing. The order of dis-
missal was vacated and the case was remanded.8
The Eighth Circuit opinion does not mean that notice to the parents of
a hearing for the appointment of a guardian ad litem will never be
allowed. The court discouraged such an interpretation of its holding when
it declined to decide the case on the basis of the language of the rule itself.
Instead, the court based its holding on the unique factual situation present
in M.S.'s case and thereby narrowly restricted the influence and scope of
its decision.
The appointment of a guardian ad litem in federal court is governed
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). 9 Unlike some state courts' rules,' 0
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. 409 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.D. 1976).
6. 557 F.2d at 173 n.2.
7. Id. at 174.
8. Id. at 176.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) provides:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as
a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent
person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly ap-
pointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian ad
litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or in-
competent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make
such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or in-
competent person.
10. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.02(c) provides:
Such appointment shall be made on the petition in writing of such minor
if of the age of fourteen years and the written consent of the person pro-
posed to be next friend. If such minor be under the age of fourteen years,
the appointment of a next friend may be made upon the written applica- 2
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the federal rules are silent concerning notice to the parents. The absence
of any language requiring notice to the parents could be interpreted as
meaning that it is not within the court's discretion to require notice.
However, in light of centuries of strict parental control of children, it is not
likely that Congress intended an interpretation forbidding notice to the
parents. It is also doubtful that the rule should be interpreted as requiring
notice to the parents in all cases. If Congress had intended such a result it
would have included an express notice requirement, as several states have
done. The federal rule does provide that the court must appoint a guard-
ian ad litem for a minor or "shall make such other order as it deems proper
for the protection of the infant." Apparently a court, relying on this por-
tion of the rule, could require notice to the parents where the court in its
discretion finds that such notice is necessary to protect the child.
The Wermers opinion fails to discuss the effect of the absence of an ex-
press notice requirement." It simply states that notice is not necessary in
this action. The court could have based its holding on an examination and
interpretation of the language of the rule, concluding that the district
court judge abused his discretion in requiring something not expressly pro-
vided for in the rule. In the alternative, the court might have examined the
South Dakota rule, 12 also silent concerning notice, comparing it with a
rule like that in Missouri which requires notice to the person with whom
the minor resides if the minor is under fourteen years of age. ' 3 The court
then could have concluded that notice to the parents should not be re-
quired since neither the federal rule nor the South Dakota rule contained a
notice provision.' 4
tion of a relative or friend of the minor, in which case a notice thereof
must be given to the person with whom such minor resides.
See also N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw § 1202(b) (McKinney); WIS. STAT. § 803.01(3)(b)
(1977); WYO. STAT. § 3-2-101 (1977).
11. The court considers whether the state or federal rule should control and
concludes: "Regardless of whether state or federal law should be applied, the
District Court was bound to consider the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the minor plaintiff and clearly had the power to appoint one in her behalf." 557
F.2d at 174. Further discussion is left to a footnote, wherein the court notes that
notice to the parents is not expressly required under state or federal law. Id. at
176 n.6.
12. The relevant provisions of South Dakota law are S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 26-1-3 (1976 Revision) ("A minor may enforce his rights by civil action...
in the same manner as a person of full age, except that a guardian must be ap-
pointed to conduct the same.") and S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-17(c)
(1967) (with provisions substantially identical to the provisions of FED. R. CIV. P.
17(c)).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. For other state rules of procedure and statutes containing no notice pro-
vision, see FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.210(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-117(c); IND. R.
TRIAL P. 17(c); IOWA R. CIV. P. 12; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-307 (1975); N.M. R.
Civ. P. 17(c); VT. R. Civ. P. 17(b); VA. CODE § 8.01-9 (1977); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.08.050 (1962).
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The Eighth Circuit took neither approach; they instead issued an opin-
ion with little direct precedential value beyond the specific facts of the case
decided. An interpretation of either the federal or state15 rule to prevent
the mandatory notice to parents would have had much broader impact;
consideration of this issue was relegated to a footnote,1 6 a disposition which
can be read as a conscious attempt to leave resolution of the underlying
issues for another day. The announced bases for the holding were the
special subject matter of the case and the constitutional issues involved.
A minor's ability to bring suit without her parents' knowledge would
involve two recognized constitutional rights: the right to bring suit in-
herent in due process17 and the right of privacy. 18 A rule expressly or im-
pliedly requiring notice to her parents of the appointment of a guardian ad
litem would arguably infringe on these constitutional rights. However, the
initial question is whether a minor is deemed to possess these rights to the
same degree as an adult.
Until recently, a child's rights under the constitution have not engen-
dered significant amounts of litigation.' 9 The cases have arisen mainly
from the juvenile court system 20 or the schools. 2' The United States
15. The federal rule is applied to the exclusion of the state rule in this case.
557 F.2d at 174 n.4.
16. Id. at 176 n.6.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall.., be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " The United States
Supreme Court listed the right of access to the courts as a fundamental right
guaranteed by the constitution in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
18. The Supreme Court acknowledged the right of privacy in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973):
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.
[But] the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Con-
stitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, in-
deed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment; in
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaran-
teed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Citations omit-
ted.)
19. See Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 345
(1972). See also authorities cited notes 33-35 infra.
20. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for conviction of minors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(minors have a right in juvenile proceedings to notice, counsel, confrontation,
cross-examination, and privilege against self-incrimination); Gallegos v. Col-
orado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (inadmissibility of involuntary confessions against
minors).
21. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (establishing right to notice and
informal hearing in school discipline context); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (symbolic speech, upholding students' right to wear arm-
bands in protest of Vietnam war); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
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Supreme Court has not precisely defined the scope of a minor's constitu-
tional rights. In fact, the Court has refused to conclude that a minor has
constitutional rights coextensive with those of an adult. 22 Recent criminal
cases have guaranteed certain procedural rights to minors, but they have
also clearly established that a minor does not have the same constitutional
rights as an adult.23 However, since the Court has dealt with juveniles'
rights on a case by case approach, there is a possibility that a minor could
convince the Court that she has a right in due process to bring suit identical
to that of an adult. 24
If a minor's right to bring suit were considered coextensive with that of
an adult, it would be impermissible to condition that right upon parental
consent. Whether or not it would be proper to require notice to the parents
would depend upon the child's right of privacy. The Supreme Court has
extended the right of privacy to minors in the areas of abortion 25 and birth
control, 26 ratifying the positions of many lower federal courts. 27
22. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). See also Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
23. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 52"8 (1971) (holding a
state need not provide juveniles with ajury trial in the adjudicative phase of delin-
quency proceedings), with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding a state
must meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceed-
ings). Judge Henley points this out in his dissent, 557 F.2d at 177.
24. See authorities cited notes 20-23 supra.
25. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). The Court
did not extend a blanket right of privacy to minors, using instead the following
very limited language:
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor
patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance paren-
tal authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure. Any independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is
no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor
mature enough to have become pregnant.
We emphasize that our holding that § 3(4) is invalid does not suggest
that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective con-
sent for termination of her pregnancy.
26. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court cited
its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), as authority
for extending the right to privacy to minors in the area of birth control:
Of particular significance to the decision of this case, the right to
privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to
minors as well as to adults ....
Since the state may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a
blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor to ter-
minate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of
the distribution of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed.
431 U.S. at 693-94.
27. Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1974); T - H - v. Jones, 425 F.
[Vol. 44
5
Parker: Parker: Constitutional Law and the Rights of Minors
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
RECENT CASES
The Wermers court might have been affected by the many federal
court decisions upholding minors' rights to privacy in the context of birth
control. Particularly important is Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,28 which held unconstitutional a New York statute prohibiting
access to contraceptives to minors below the age of sixteen as a violation of
their right to privacy.2 9 The Wermers case also involved a minor's right to
birth control, yet the minor was prevented from establishing her right to
contraceptives based on the right to privacy when the district court dis-
missed her case for her refusal to notify her parents of the hearing on a
guardian ad litem. The Eighth Circuit might have been especially hesitant
to affirm an order which effectively precluded a minor from establishing
her right to privacy which had only recently been recognized by the
Supreme Court.
It is also probable that the Wermers court was influenced by the
Supreme Court decisions in the abortion area, especially Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth,3 0 which declared unconstitutional a Missouri statute re-
quiring parental consent for abortions. The Court in that case specifi-
cally held that the state's interest in the "safeguarding of the family unit
and of parental authority" did not outweigh the minor's right to privacy in
her decision to terminate her pregnancy.3 1 The Eighth Circuit could have
interpreted this holding to extend to a minor's right to privacy in bringing
suit.3 2
Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975); Doe v. Exon, 416 F. Supp. 716 (D. Neb. 1975);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Foe
v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F.
Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Coe v.
Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
417 U.S. 279, 280 (1974), affd in part on other grounds, 417 U.S. 281 (1974),
aff'd sub nom. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Rampton,
366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
28. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
29. However, the statute in Carey did not deal with parental consent but im-
posed a blanket prohibition on distribution of contraceptives to minors under the
age of sixteen. See also T - H - v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975) (en-
joining enforcement of state regulations requiring parental consent before a
minor may obtain state family planning services).
30. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
31. Id. at 75.
32. The Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood did not hold that notice to
the parents of a minor's abortion would violate the minor's right to privacy. It
held that a complete and arbitrary veto power in the parent violated the minor's
right to privacy. As to whether notice would be a violation, see the concurring
opinion of Justice Stewart, id. at 90, and the companion case of Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132 (1976). These suggest that a statute which did not impose parental
consent as an absolute condition upon the minor's right, but would assure con-
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Even if a minor child establishes her rights under the constitution, 33
she still might not prevail where her rights are in conflict with another's
rights. The leading cases which have dealt with a minor's rights have in-
volved a conflict between the child and the state. 34 Most of the cases which
have extended to a minor the same due process, first amendment, and
privacy rights enjoyed by an adult have involved situations where the
parent and child had a unity of interest . 3 The significant fact in Wermers
is that the child's interest conflicts with the interest of her parents and a
balancing of their competing rights is required.3 6 Our system of jurispru-
dence contains a strong tradition of the self-governing family unit and
parental control within that unit.3 7 The parents are deemed to have a
natural right to the custody, care and control of their children. This right
is inherent in our social system, it is not delegated from the state 3 and it
cannot be usurped by the state unless the parents are found to be abusing
or neglecting their obligation to support and care for the child.3 9 If the
child were granted a constitutional right in due process to bring suit with-
33. For analysis of a minor's rights under the constitution, see Note, Paren-
tal Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Con-
troversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975); Note, A Minor's Right to Contracep-
tives, 7 U. CALIF. D. L. REV. 270 (1974); Note, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 251 (1973);
Note, The Minor's Right to A bortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent,
60 VA. L. REV. 305 (1974).
34. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the right of
Amish parents to direct the religious training of their offspring prevailed over the
state's interest in compulsory school attendance until the age of sixteen); Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a
statute requiring children to attend public schools was invalid because it
restricted the parents' liberty to direct their children's upbringing); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a statute which prohibited the
teaching of foreign languages).
35. Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors:
The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1001, 1013 (1975); Note, The
Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L.
REV. 305, 321 (1974). See note 40 infra.
36. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1976) (conflict of
parents' and child's interests discussed).
37. For discussions of this tradition and the basis of the right in the parent to
control within the family unit, see Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental
Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393 (1970); Foster & Freed, A Bill ofRightsfor Children, 6
FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972); Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection: The Risk of
Children's "Rights," 63 A.B.A.J. 1383 (1977); Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power
Among Infants, Their Parents and the State: Parental Power pt. 2, 4 FAM. L.Q.
410 (1970); Note, Counseling the Counselors: Legal Implications of Counseling
Minors Without Parental Consent, 31 MD. L. REV. 332 (1971). See also the dis-
sent in Wermers, 557 F.2d at 177. "Judicial decisions have enveloped the sanctity
of the family and parental authority with constitutional protection because the
institution of the family has long been recognized as a cornerstone of our law."
38. Hafen, supra note 37, at 1388.
39. Foster & Freed, supra note 37, at 395-96.
[Vol. 44
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out her parents' consent, the parents' right to control the child would be
effectively diminished. If the child were granted a constitutional right of
privacy to bring suit without her parents' knowledge, the parents' right to
counsel and influence their child would also become a nullity. These con-
siderations make it unlikely that there will arise an absolute right in a
minor to bring suit without notice to her parents. 40
Regardless of the merits of upholding a minor's privacy and due pro-
cess rights to sue without notice generally, the Wermers court's holding
was correct under the rather unique factual situation presented. At issue
was the minor's right to privacy, not as to the underlying issue of her access
to contraceptives, but as to notice to her parents of her pending suit. The
effect of the district court's requirement that she notify her parents would
be to destroy the right she was seeking before she had a chance to establish
that right. 4 1 The Eighth Circuit concluded, "[a]ppellant brought this ac-
tion anonymously, and to require her to disclose her participation to her
parents at this stage would substantially nullify the privacy right she seeks
to vindicate. 4 2
40, Two recent Supreme Court decisions have granted a limited right to
privacy in minors. See notes 25 & 26 supra. The concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in Planned Parenthood strongly suggest that the interests of the parents and
child are not in conflict in that case. 428 U.S. at 90-95, 103-05. See also the con-
curring opinion of Justice Powell in Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. at
703-09.
41. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) ("To require that it
be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at
the very moment of its assertion."). See also Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536,541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("Here, however, if plaintiffs are required to reveal their
identity prior to the adjudication on the merits of their privacy claim, they will
already have sustained the injury which by this litigation they seek to avoid.").
42. 557 F.2d at 176. For a recent case where the court weighed the parent's
right to know against the minor's right to privacy, see Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp.
1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977), which
held that a state-funded family planning clinic's practice of distributing prescrip-
tion contraceptives to unemancipated minors without notice to their parents
violated parental rights protected by the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments. In that case, the parents were the plaintiffs and the court's holding
dealt with notice, not consent. On remand, the district court distinguished Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977):
[A] close reading of Carey indicates a majority of the Supreme Court
would support a state statute requiring prior parental notice and con-
sultation before non-prescriptive contraceptives are- distributed to
unemancipated minors. The present case differs substantially from
Carey, but the differences are such that Carey provides additional sup-
port for the position previously reached by this court. The instant case
involves the distribution of prescriptive contraceptives and the many
dangerous medical complications attendant thereto. The result reached
in the instant case in no way would prevent unemancipated minors from
obtaining contraceptives-it would only require prior parental notifica-
1979]
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The court also pointed out that her parents would not be appropriate
guardians ad litem in this case. M.S. submitted an affidavit stating that
her parents would not consent to her receipt of contraceptives .43 Therefore
they would be ill-suited to guide her in a suit wherein she challenged the
policy of parental consent for minors in obtaining contraceptives. The
court thus held that "it was equally inappropriate and unnecessary to con-
dition the further progress of the lawsuit upon notification to the parents
of the hearing on the appointment." 44 The Eighth Circuit supported this
conclusion by citing the "obvious chilling effect"45 which the district
court's order had already had on M.S.'s effort to establish her constitu-
tional right, since she had suffered dismissal rather than notify her
parents.
The dissenting opinion also seeks to balance the interests of the parents
and child. Judge Henley felt that a minor's right to litigate in private does
not outweigh the parents' right to advise and protect the child. He based
his decision on the right of the parent to counsel the child and the fear that
the court would be participating in a deception which would undermine
"family solidarity." 46 The'language of his opinion indicates that he ex-
amined the merits of the underlying dispute rather than restricting con-
sideration to the procedural issues raised on appeal.
It is unlikely that the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Wermers will be
given the broad interpretation that minors may sue under Rule 17(c) just
as adults may. The rule still provides that the court may decide whether a
guardian ad litem should be appointed for a minor. A broad reading of the
case would clearly be beyond the expectations of the Wermers court.
Although the court held that this minor could bring suit without her
parents' knowledge, it did not hold and surely did not intend that a minor
could in all circumstances sue in federal court without notice to her
parents.
Instead the Eighth Circuit's holding should be given a narrow inter-
pretation, strictly limited to the facts of this case. Notice to a minor's
parents of the appointment of a guardian ad litem cannot be required
tion and the opportunity for consultation before that civil right, which
surely implicates the capacity of the minor, is exercised.
Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (footnote omitted). See
also Roe v. Rampton, 394 F. Supp. 677 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1219(10th Cir. 1976) (denying injunctive relief from a state statute requiring the physi-
cian to notify the husband or parents of a woman on whom an abortion is to be
performed).
43. Judge Henley's dissent in M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d at 176 n.5, points
out the "crucial distinction between appointing parents to serve as guardians ad
litem and notifying them that their minor child is involved in serious litigation for
which a guardian ad litem may be appointed."
44. 557 F.2d at 176.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 178.
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